Abstract. Extending bilinear elliptic curve pairings to multilinear maps is a long-standing open problem. The first plausible construction of such multilinear maps has recently been described by Garg, Gentry and Halevi, based on ideal lattices. In this paper we describe a different construction that works over the integers instead of ideal lattices, similar to the DGHV fully homomorphic encryption scheme. We also describe a different technique for proving the full randomization of encodings: instead of Gaussian linear sums, we apply the classical leftover hash lemma over a quotient lattice. We show that our construction is relatively practical: for reasonable security parameters a one-round 7-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange requires less than 40 seconds per party. Moreover, in contrast with previous work, multilinear analogues of useful, base group assumptions like DLIN appear to hold in our setting.
Introduction
Multilinear maps. Extending bilinear elliptic curve pairings to multilinear maps is a long-standing open problem. In 2003 Boneh and Silverberg showed two interesting applications of multilinear maps [BS03] , namely multipartite Diffie-Hellman and very efficient broadcast encryption; however they were pessimistic about the existence of such maps from the realm of algebraic geometry.
The first plausible construction of multilinear maps has recently been described by Garg, Gentry and Halevi, based on ideal lattices [GGH13] . The main difference with bilinear pairings is that the encoding a · g of an element a is randomized (with some noise) instead of deterministic; only the computed multilinear map e(a 1 · g, . . . , a κ · g) is a deterministic function of the a i 's only. The construction has bounded degree with a maximum degree κ at most polynomial in the security parameter. Indeed, the encoding noise grows linearly with the degree, and when the noise reaches a certain threshold the encoding can become incorrect, as for ciphertexts in a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. The security of the construction relies on new hardness assumptions which are natural extensions of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. To gain more confidence in their scheme the authors provide an extensive cryptanalytic survey. The authors focus on one application: the multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
The construction from [GGH13] works in the polynomial ring R = Z[X]/(X n + 1), where n is large enough to ensure security. One generates a secret short ring element g ∈ R, generating a principal ideal I = g ⊂ R. One also generates an integer parameter q and another random secret z ∈ R/qR. One encodes elements of the quotient ring R/I, namely elements of the form e + I for some e, as follows: a level-i encoding of the coset e + I is an element of the form u k = [c/z i ] q , where c ∈ e + I is short. Such encodings can be both added and multiplied, as long as the norm of the numerators remain shorter than q; in particular the product of κ encodings at level 1 gives an encoding at level κ. For such level-κ encodings one can then define a zero-testing parameter p zt = [hz κ /g] q , for some small h ∈ R. Then given a level-κ encoding u = [c/z κ ] one can compute [p zt · u] q = [hc/g] q . When c is an encoding of zero we have c/g ∈ R, which implies that hc/g is small in R, and therefore [hc/g] q is small; this provides a way to test whether a level-κ encoding c is an encoding of 0. For the same reason the high-order bits of [p zt · u] q = [hc/g] q only depend on the An extended abstract will appear at Crypto 2013; this is the full version.
coset e + I and not on the particular c ∈ e + I; this makes it possible to extract a representation of cosets encoded at level κ, and eventually defines a degree-κ multilinear map for level-1 encodings.
Our contributions. Our main contribution is to describe a different construction that works over the integers instead of ideal lattices, similar to the DGHV fully homomorphic encryption scheme [DGHV10] and its batch variant [CCK + 13]. Our construction offers the same flexibility as the original from [GGH13] ; in particular it can be modified to support the analogue of asymmetric maps and composite-order maps. Moreover, it does not seem vulnerable to the "zeroizing" attack that breaks base group hardness assumptions like the analogues of DLIN and subgroup membership for the multilinear maps of [GGH13] . Since those assumptions are believed necessary to adapt constructions of primitives like adaptively secure functional encryption and NIZK, our construction seems even more promising for applications than [GGH13] . In Appendix C, we provide a comparison with the original scheme, to better highlight the similarities.
As in [GGH13] , the security of our construction relies on new assumptions; it cannot be derived from "classical" assumptions such as the Approximate-GCD assumption used in [DGHV10] . We describe various possible attacks against our scheme; this enables us to derive parameters for which our scheme remains secure against these attacks.
Our new construction works as follows: one first generates n secret primes p i and publishes x 0 = n i=1 p i (where n is large enough to ensure correctness and security); one also generates n small secret primes g i , and a random secret integer z modulo x 0 . A level-k encoding of a vector m = (m i ) ∈ Z n is then an integer c such that for all 1 i n:
for some small random integers r i ; the integer c is therefore defined modulo x 0 by CRT. It is clear that such encodings can be both added and multiplied modulo x 0 , as long as the numerators remain smaller than the p i 's. In particular the product of κ encodings c j at level 1 gives an encoding at level κ where the corresponding vectors m j are multiplied componentwise. For such level-κ encodings one defines a zero-testing parameter p zt with:
for some small integers h i . Given a level-κ encoding c as in (1), one can compute ω = p zt · c mod x 0 , which gives:
Then if m i = 0 for all i, since the r i 's and h i 's are small, we obtain that ω is small compared to x 0 ; this enables to test whether c is an encoding of 0 or not. Moreover for non-zero encodings the leading bits of ω only depend on the m i 's and not on the noise r i ; for level-κ encodings this enables to extract a function of the m i 's only, which eventually defines as in [GGH13] a degree-κ multilinear map. 1 Our second contribution is to describe a different technique for proving the full randomization of encodings. As in [GGH13] the randomization of encodings is obtained by adding a random subset-sum of encodings of 0 from the public parameters. However as in [GGH13] the Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL) cannot be directly applied since the encodings live in some infinite ring instead of a finite group. The solution in [GGH13] consists in using linear sums with Gaussian coefficients; it is shown in [AGHS12] that the resulting sum has a Gaussian distribution (over some lattice). As noted by the authors, this can be seen as a "leftover hash lemma over lattices". In this paper we describe a different technique that does not use Gaussian coefficients; instead it consists in working modulo some lattice L ⊂ Z n and applying the leftover hash lemma over the quotient Z n /L, which is still a finite group. Such technique was already used to prove the security of the batch variant of the DGHV fully homomorphic encryption scheme [CCK + 13,CLT13]. Here we provide a more formal description: we clearly state our "LHL over lattices" so that it can later be applied as a black-box (as the corresponding Theorem 3 in [AGHS12] ). Our quotient lattice technique can independently be applied to the original encoding scheme from [GGH13] , while the Gaussian sum technique from [AGHS12] is also applicable to ours.
Our third contribution is to describe the first implementation of multilinear maps. It appears that the basic versions of both [GGH13] and our scheme are rather unpractical, because of the huge public parameter size required to randomize the encodings. Therefore we use a simple optimization that consists in storing only a small subset of the public elements and combining them pairwise to generate the full public-key. Such optimization was originally described in [GH11] for reducing the size of the encryption of the secret-key bits in the implementation of Gentry's FHE scheme [Gen09] . It was also used in [CMNT11] to reduce the public-key size of the DGHV scheme; however, as opposed to the latter work our randomization of encodings is heuristic only, whereas in [CMNT11] the semantic security was still guaranteed. Thanks to this optimization our construction becomes relatively practical: for reasonable security parameters a multipartite Diffie-Hellman computation with 7 users requires less than 40 seconds, with a public parameter size of roughly 2.6 GBytes; a proof-of-concept implementation is available at [Lep] .
Definition of Randomized Encodings and Multilinear Maps
In this section we recall the setting introduced in [GGH13] for the notion of randomized encodings and multilinear maps, which they call graded encoding schemes. There are essentially two main differences with classical bilinear pairings (and their generalization to cryptographic multilinear maps as considered in [BS03] ):
1. In bilinear pairings (and more generally cryptographic multilinear maps) we have a map e : G κ → G T that is linear with respect to all its κ inputs:
One can view a · g as an "encoding" of the integer a ∈ Z p over the group G of order p generated by g. The main difference in our setting is that encodings are now randomized. This means that an element a ∈ R (where R is a ring that plays the role of the exponent space Z p ) has many possible encodings; only the final multilinear map e(a 1 · g, . . . , a κ · g) is a deterministic function of the a i 's only, and not on the randomness used to encode a i into a i · g. 2. The second main difference is that to every encoding is now associated a level. At level 0 we have the "plaintext" ring elements a ∈ R, at level 1 we have the encoding a · g, and by combining k such encodings a i · g at level 1 one obtains a level-k encoding where the underlying elements a i are homomorphically multiplied in R. The difference with "classical" cryptographic multilinear maps is that we can now multiply any (bounded) subset of encodings, instead of strictly κ at a time as with (2). For encodings at level κ we have a special zero-testing parameter p zt that can extract a deterministic function of the underlying ring elements. This enables to define a degree-κ multilinear map for encodings at level 1.
Graded Encoding System
We recall the formal definition of a κ-Graded Encoding System from [GGH13] . For simplicity we only consider the symmetric case throughout the paper; we refer to [GGH13] for a more general framework that can handle the asymmetric case.
Definition 1 (κ-Graded Encoding System [GGH13] ). A κ-Graded Encoding System for a ring R is a system of sets S = {S (α 1 +α 2 ) i and neg(params, u 1 ) ∈ S (−α 1 ) i
. Below we write u 1 + u 2 and −u 1 as a shorthand for applying these procedures.
Zero-test. The procedure isZero(params, p zt , u) outputs 1 if u ∈ S (0) κ and 0 otherwise. Extraction. The procedure extracts a random function of ring elements from their level-κ encoding. Namely ext(params, p zt , u) outputs s ∈ {0, 1} λ , such that:
This concludes the definition of the procedures. In [GGH13] the authors consider a slightly relaxed definition of isZero and ext, where isZero can still output 1 even for some non-zero encoding u with negligible probability, and ext can extract different outputs when applied to encodings of the same elements, also with negligible probability; see [GGH13] for the corresponding definitions.
Hardness Assumptions
Finally we recall the hardness assumptions for multilinear maps from [GGH13] ; as previously we consider only the symmetric case and refer to [GGH13] for the general case. In this symmetric case given a set of κ + 1 level-one encodings of random elements, it should be unfeasible to distinguish a level-κ encoding of their product from random.
Graded DDH (GDDH). Let GE be a graded encoding scheme consisting of all the routines above. For an adversary A and parameters λ, κ we consider the following process:
Choose a j ← samp(params) for all 1 j κ + 1 3. Set u j ← reRand(params, 1, enc(params, 1, a j )) for all 1 j κ + 1 // encodings at level 1 4. Choose b ← samp(params) // encoding at level 0
// encoding of the right product at level κ
// encoding of a random product at level κ
The GDDH distinguisher is given as input the κ+1 level-one encodings u j and eitherũ (encoding the right product) orû (encoding a random product), and must decide which is the case. The GDDH assumption states that the advantage of any efficient adversary is negligible in the security parameter.
Our new Encoding Scheme
System parameters. The main parameters are the security parameter λ and the required multilinearity level κ poly(λ). Based on λ and κ, we choose the vector dimension n, the bit-size η of the primes p i , the bit-size α of the primes g i , the maximum bit-size ρ of the randomness used in encodings, and various other parameters that will be specified later; the constraints that these parameters must satisfy are described in the next section. For integers z, p we denote the reduction of z modulo p by (z mod p)
In our scheme a level-k encoding of a vector m = (m i ) ∈ Z n is an integer c such that for all 1 i n:
where the r i 's are ρ-bit random integers (specific to the encoding c), with the following secret parameters: the p i 's are η-bit prime integers, the g i 's are α-bit primes, and the denominator z is a random (invertible) integer modulo x 0 = n i=1 p i . The integer c is therefore defined by CRT modulo x 0 , where x 0 is made public. Since the p i 's must remain secret, the user cannot encode the vectors m ∈ Z n by CRT directly from (3); instead one includes in the public parameters a set of level-0 encodings x j of random vectors a j ∈ Z n , and the user can generate a random level-0 encoding by computing a random subset-sum of those x j 's.
Remark 1. From (3) each integer m i is actually defined modulo g i . Therefore our scheme encodes vectors m from the ring R = Z g 1 × · · · × Z gn .
Instance generation: (params, p zt ) ← InstGen(1 λ , 1 κ ). We generate n secret random η-bit primes p i and publish x 0 = n i=1 p i . We generate a random invertible integer z modulo x 0 . We generate n random α-bit prime integers g i and a secret matrix A = (a ij ) ∈ Z n× , where each component a ij is randomly generated in [0, g i ) ∩ Z. We generate an integer y, three sets of integers {x j } τ j=1 , {x j } j=1 and {Π j } n j=1 , a zero-testing vector p zt , and a seed s for a strong randomness extractor, as described later. We publish the parameters params = n, η, α, ρ, β, τ, , y, {x j } τ j=1 , {x j } j=1 , {Π j } n j=1 , s and p zt .
Sampling level-zero encodings: c ← samp(params). We publish as part as our instance generation a set of integers x j , where each x j encodes at level-0 the column vector a j ∈ Z n of the secret matrix A = (a ij ) ∈ Z n× . More precisely, using the CRT modulo x 0 we generate integers x j such that:
where the r ij 's are randomly generated in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) ∩ Z.
Our randomized sampling algorithm samp(params) works as follows: we generate a random binary vector b = (b j ) ∈ {0, 1} and output the level-0 encoding
From Equation (4), this gives c ≡ j=1 r ij b j · g i + j=1 a ij b j (mod p i ); as required the output c is a level-0 encoding:
of some vector m = A · b ∈ Z n which is a random subset-sum of the column vectors a j . We note that for such level-0 encodings we get |r i · g i + m i | · 2 ρ+α for all i. The following Lemma states that, as required, the distribution of m can be made statistically close to uniform over R = Z g 1 × · · · × Z gn ; the proof is based on applying the LHL over the set R (see Appendix A).
The distribution of (params, m) is statistically close to the distribution of (params, m ) where m ← R.
Encodings at higher levels: c k ← enc(params, k, c). To allow encoding at higher levels, we publish as part of our instance-generation a level-one random encoding of 1, namely an integer y such that:
for random integers r i ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) ∩ Z; as previously the integer y is computed by CRT modulo x 0 . Given a level-0 encoding c of m ∈ Z n as given by (5), we can then compute a level-1 encoding of the same m by computing c 1 = c · y mod x 0 . Namely we obtain as required:
for some integers r
(1)
i , and we get |r
In multipartite Diffie-Hellman key-exchange every user keeps a private level-0 encoding c and publishes a level-1 encoding of the same underlying (unknown) m; however one cannot publish c 1 = c · y mod x 0 directly since the private level-0 encoding c could be recovered immediately from c = c 1 /y mod x 0 . Instead the level-1 encoding c 1 must first be re-randomized into a new level-1 encoding c 1 whose distribution does not depend on the original c as long as it encodes the same m.
Re-randomization: c ← reRand(params, i, c). To allow re-randomization of encodings at level one, we publish as part of our instance-generation a set of n integers Π j which are all level-1 random encodings of zero:
The matrix Π = ( ij ) ∈ Z n×n is a diagonally dominant matrix generated as follows: the nondiagonal entries are randomly and independently generated in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) ∩ Z, while the diagonal entries are randomly generated in (n2 ρ , n2 ρ + 2 ρ ) ∩ Z.
We also publish as part of our instance-generation a set of τ integers x j , where each x j is a level-1 random encoding of zero:
and where the column vectors of the matrix (r ij ) ∈ Z n×τ are randomly and independently generated in the half-open parallelepiped spanned by the columns of the previous matrix Π; see Appendix E for a concrete algorithm. Given as input a level-1 encoding c 1 as given by (6), we randomize c 1 with a random subset-sum of the x j 's and a linear combination of the Π j 's:
where b j ← {0, 1}, and b j ← [0, 2 µ )∩Z. The following Lemma shows that as required the distribution of c 1 is nearly independent of the input (as long as it encodes the same m). This follows essentially from our "leftover hash lemma over lattices"; see Section 4.
Lemma 2. Let c ← samp(params), c 1 ← enc(params, 1, c), and c 1 ← reRand(params, 1, c 1 ). Write
for all 1 i n, and r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) T . Let τ n · (ρ + log 2 (2n)) + 2λ and µ ρ + α + λ. The distribution of (params, r) is statistically close to that of (params, r ), where r ∈ Z n is randomly generated in the half-open parallelepiped spanned by the column vectors of 2 µ Π.
, and using |r ij · g i | 2n2 ρ+α for all i, j, we obtain
Adding and Multiplying Encodings. It is clear that one can homomorphically add encodings. Moreover the product of κ level-1 encodings u i can be interpreted as an encoding of the product. Namely, given level-one encodings u j of vectors m j ∈ Z n for 1 j κ, with u j ≡ (r ij · g i + m ij )/z (mod p i ), we simply let:
This gives:
for some r i ∈ Z. This is a level-κ encoding of the vector m obtained by componentwise product of the vectors m j , as long as
When computing the product of κ level-1 encodings from reRand and one level-0 encoding from samp (as in multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange), we obtain from previous bounds |r i | (4n 2 2 µ+ρ+α ) κ · · 2 ρ+1 for all i.
Zero Testing. isZero(params, p zt , u κ ) ? = 0/1. We can test equality between encodings by subtracting them and testing for zero. To enable zero testing we randomly generate an integer matrix H = (h ij ) ∈ Z n×n such that H is invertible in Z and both H T ∞ 2 β and (H −1 ) T ∞ 2 β , for some parameter β specified later; here · ∞ is the operator norm on n × n matrices with respect to the ∞ norm on R n . A technique for generating such H is discussed in Appendix F. We then publish as part of our instance generation the following zero-testing vector p zt ∈ Z n :
To determine whether a level-κ encoding c is an encoding of zero or not, we compute the vector ω = c · p zt mod x 0 and test whether ω ∞ is small:
for some parameter ν specified later. Namely for a level-κ ciphertext c we have c ≡ (r i · g i + m i )/z κ (mod p i ) for some r i ∈ Z; therefore for all 1 i n we can write:
for some q i ∈ Z. Therefore combining (8) and (9), we get:
Therefore if m i = 0 for all 1 i n, then ω ∞ = c · p zt mod x 0 ∞ is small compared to x 0 when the r i 's are small enough, i.e. a limited number of additions/multiplications on encodings has been performed. Conversely if m i = 0 for some i we show that ω ∞ must be large. More precisely we prove the following lemma in Appendix B.
Lemma 3. Let n, η, α and β be as in our parameter setting. Let ρ f be such that ρ f + λ + α + 2β η − 8, and let
Extraction. sk ← ext(params, p zt , u κ ). This part is essentially the same as in [GGH13] . To extract a random function of the vector m encoded in a level-κ encoding c, we multiply c by the zero-testing parameter p zt modulo x 0 , collect the ν most significant bits of each of the n components of the resulting vector, and apply a strong randomness extractor (using the seed s from params):
where msbs ν extracts the ν most significant bits of the result. Namely if two encodings c and c encode the same m ∈ Z n then from Lemma 3 we have (c − c ) · p zt mod x 0 ∞ < x 0 · 2 −ν−λ−2 , and therefore we expect that ω = c · p zt mod x 0 and ω = c · p zt mod x 0 agree on their ν most significant bits, and therefore extract to the same value. 2 Conversely if c and c encode different vectors then by Lemma 3 we must have (c − c ) · p zt mod x 0 ∞ > x 0 · 2 −ν+2 , and therefore the ν most significant bits of the corresponding ω and ω must be different. This implies that for random m ∈ R = Z g 1 × · · · × Z gn the min-entropy of msbs ν (c · p zt mod x 0 ) when c encodes m is at least log 2 |R| n(α − 1). Therefore we can use a strong randomness extractor to extract a nearly uniform bit-string of length log 2 |R| − λ.
This concludes the description of our multilinear encoding scheme. In Appendix C we provide a comparison with the original scheme from [GGH13] .
Setting the Parameters
The system parameters must satisfy the following constraints:
• The bit-size ρ of the randomness used for encodings must satisfy ρ = Ω(λ) to avoid brute force attack on the noise, including the improved attack from [CN12] with complexityÕ(2 ρ/2 ).
2 Two coefficients ω and ω from ω and ω could still be on the opposite sides of a boundary, with ω/2 k = v and ω /2 k = v + 1, so that ω and ω would extract to different MSBs v and v + 1. Heuristically this happens with probability O(2 −λ ). The argument can be made rigorous by generating a public random integer W modulo x0 in the parameters, and extracting the MSBs of ω + W mod x0 instead of ω mod x0 for all coefficients ω of the vector ω.
• The bit-size α of the primes g i must be large enough so that the order of the group R = Z g 1 × · · · × Z gn does not contain small prime factors; this is required to prove the security of the multipartite Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (see Appendix D). One can take α = λ.
• The parameter n must be large enough to thwart lattice-based attacks on the encodings, namely n = ω(η log λ); see Section 5.1.
• The number of level-0 encodings x j for samp must satisfy n · α + 2λ in order to apply the leftover hash lemma; see Lemma 1.
• The number τ of level-1 encodings x j must satisfy τ n · (ρ + log 2 (2n)) + 2λ in order to apply our "leftover hash lemma over lattices". For the same reason the bit-size µ of the linear sum coefficients must satisfy µ α + ρ + λ; see Lemma 2.
• The bitsize β of the matrix H entries must satisfy β = Ω(λ) in order to avoid the GCD attack from Section 5.2. One can take β = λ.
• The bit-size η of the primes p i must satisfy η ρ f + α + 2β + λ + 8, where ρ f is the maximum bit size of the randoms r i a level-κ encoding (see Lemma 3). When computing the product of κ level-1 encodings and an additional level-0 encoding (as in a multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange with N = κ + 1 users), one obtains ρ f = κ · (µ + ρ + α + 2 log 2 n + 2) + ρ + log 2 + 1 (see previous Section).
• The number ν of most significant bits to extract can then be set to ν = η − β − ρ f − λ − 3 (see Lemma 3).
Security of our Construction
As in [GGH13] the security of our construction relies on new assumptions that do not seem to be reducible to more classical assumptions. Namely, as in [GGH13] one can make the assumption that solving the Graded DDH problem (GDDH) recalled in Section 2.3 is hard in our scheme. This enables to prove the security of the one-round N -way Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [GGH13] . Ideally one would like to reduce such assumption to a more classical assumption, such as the Approximate-GCD assumption, but that does not seem feasible. Therefore to gain more confidence in our scheme we describe various attacks in Section 5.
Another Leftover Hash Lemma over Lattices
As mentioned in the introduction, to prove the full randomization of encodings (Lemma 2) one cannot apply the classical Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL) because the noise in the encodings live in some infinite ring instead of a finite group. In [GGH13] the issue was solved by using linear sums with Gaussian coefficients. Namely the analysis in [AGHS12] shows that the resulting sum has a Gaussian distribution (over some lattice). As noted by the authors this technique can be seen as a "leftover hash lemma over lattices". Such a technique would be applicable to our scheme as well. In this section we describe an alternative technique (without Gaussian coefficients) that can also be seen as a "leftover hash lemma over lattices". It consists in working modulo a lattice L ⊂ Z n and applying the classical leftover hash lemma over the finite group Z n /L. This technique was already used in [CCK + 13,CLT13] to prove the security of a batch extension of the DGHV scheme. In this paper we provide a more formal description; namely we clearly state our "LHL over lattices" so that it can later be applied as a black-box (as the corresponding Theorem 3 in [AGHS12] ). Namely our quotient lattice technique can independently be applied to the original encoding scheme from [GGH13] .
Classical Leftover Hash Lemma
We first recall the classical Leftover Hash Lemma. We say that the distributions D 1 , D 2 over a finite domain X are ε-statistically close if the statistical distance
smaller than ε. A distribution D is ε-uniform if its statistical distance from the uniform distribution is at most ε. A family H of hash functions from X to Y , both finite sets, is said to be pairwiseindependent if for all distinct x, x ∈ X, Pr h←H [h(x) = h(x )] = 1/|Y |.
Lemma 4 (Leftover Hash Lemma [HILL99])
. Let H be a family of pairwise hash functions from X to Y . Suppose that h ← H and x ← X are chosen uniformly and independently. Then,
One can then deduce the following Lemma for random subset sums over a finite abelian group.
Lemma 5. Let G be a finite abelian group. Set x 1 , . . . , x m ← G uniformly and independently, set s 1 , . . . , s m ← {0, 1}, and set y = m i=1 s i x i ∈ G. Then (x 1 , . . . , x m , y) is 1/2 |G|/2 m -uniform over G m+1 .
Proof. We consider the following hash function family H from {0, 1} m to G. Each member h ∈ H is parameterized by the elements (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ G m . Given s ∈ {0, 1} m , we define h(s) = m i=1 s i ·x i ∈ G. The hash function family is clearly pairwise independent. Therefore by Lemma 4, (h, h(x)) is 1 2 |G|/2 m -uniform over G m+1 .
Leftover Hash Lemma over Lattices
Let L ⊂ Z n be a lattice of rank n of basis B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ). Then every x ⊂ Z n can be uniquely written as:
for some real numbers ξ i . Moreover, for every vector x ∈ Z n there is a unique a ∈ L such that:
where 0 ξ i < 1; we write y = x mod B. Therefore each vector of Z n /L has a unique representative in the half-open parallelepiped defined by the previous equation. We denote by D B the distribution obtained by generating a random element in the quotient Z n /L and taking its unique representative in the half-open parallelepiped generated by the basis B. Given a basis B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) and µ ∈ Z * we denote by µB the basis (µb 1 , . . . , µb n ). We are now ready to state our "Leftover Hash Lemma over Lattices".
Lemma 6. Let L ⊂ Z n be a lattice of rank n of basis B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ). Let x i for 1 i m be generated independently according to the distribution D B . Set s 1 , . . . , s m ← {0, 1} and t 1 , . . . ,
Then the distributions (x 1 , . . . , x m , y) and (x 1 , . . . , x m , y ) are ε-statistically close, with ε = mn · 2 −µ + 1/2 |det L|/2 m .
Proof. We consider the intermediate variable:
Firstly by applying the leftover hash lemma over the finite abelian group G = Z n /L, we obtain that the distributions (x 1 , . . . , x m , This implies that the distributions (x 1 , . . . , x m , y ) and (x 1 , . . . , x m , y ) are also ε 1 -statistically close. Secondly we write:
where χ j ∈ Z for all j. We also write x i = j ξ ij b j where by definition 0 ξ ij < 1 for all i, j. This gives:
which implies 0 m i=1 s i ξ ij − χ j < 1 for all j, and therefore 0 χ j m for all j. Combining Equations (11) and (12) we have:
where as shown above 0 χ i m for all i. This implies that the distributions (x 1 , . . . , x m , y) and (x 1 , . . . , x m , y ) are ε 2 -statistically close, with ε 2 = mn2 −µ . Therefore the distributions (x 1 , . . . , x m , y) and (x 1 , . . . , x m , y ) are (ε 1 + ε 2 )-statistically close, which proves the Lemma.
We also show that the previous distribution D 2 µ B is not significantly modified when a small vector z ∈ Z n is added and the operator norm of the corresponding matrix B −1 is upper-bounded.
Lemma 7. Let L ⊂ Z n be a full-rank lattice of basis B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ), and let B ∈ Z n×n be the matrix whose column vectors are the b i 's. For any z ∈ Z n , the distribution of z + D 2 µ B is ε-statistically close to that of D 2 µ B , where
Proof. Let u ← D 2 µ B and u ← z + D 2 µ B . We can write:
where v ← D B and s i ← [0, 2 µ ) ∩ Z. We consider the intermediate variable:
The distribution of u and u are clearly the same. Let ψ = z + v. We have:
where t = B −1 · ψ . This gives:
We have t = B −1 · z + B −1 · v . Since v is in the half-open parallelepiped spanned by B we have that the components of B −1 · v are in [0, 1), which gives:
Therefore the variables u and u are ε-statistically close, with ε = 2 −µ B −1 ∞ · z ∞ + 1 . This proves the Lemma.
Re-Randomization of Encodings: Proof of Lemma 2
We are now ready to apply our "LHL over lattices" to prove the full randomization of encodings as stated in Lemma 2. Namely the re-randomization equation (7) can be rewritten in vector form as:
where b ← {0, 1} τ and b ← ([0, 2 µ ) ∩ Z) n , and the columns of the matrix X ∈ Z n×τ are uniformly and independently generated in the parallelepiped spanned by the columns of the matrix Π ∈ Z n×n . To conclude, it therefore suffices to apply Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, using additionally an upper bound on Π −1 ∞ . For this we use the fact that Π has been generated as a diagonally dominant matrix.
Given a matrix B = (b ij ) ∈ R n×n , we let Λ i (B) = k =i |b ik |. A matrix B = (b ij ) ∈ R n×n is said to be diagonally dominant if |b ii | > Λ i (B) for all i. We recall the following fact for diagonally dominant matrices [Var75, Pri51] .
Fact 1 Let B = (b ij ) ∈ R n×n be a diagonally dominant matrix. Then the matrix B is invertible and
−1 where · ∞ is the operator norm on n × n matrices with respect to the ∞ norm on R n .
Fact 2 Let B = (b ij ) ∈ R n×n be a diagonally dominant matrix. Then
Proof (of Lemma 2). We write c 1 ≡ r
(1) i · g i + m i /z mod p i for all 1 i n and define
(mod p i ) and define the matrix X = (r ij ) ∈ Z n×τ and Π = ( ij ) ∈ Z n×n . From the re-randomization equation (7), we can write:
Since at instance generation the columns of X are generated uniformly and independently in the parallelepiped spanned by the columns of Π, applying our "leftover hash lemma over lattices" (Lemma 6) we obtain that the distribution of (params, r) is ε 1 -close to the distribution of (params, r (1) + D 2 µ Π ), with
Since Π is a diagonally dominant matrix, we obtain from Fact 2
which gives ε 1 nτ 2 −µ +2 (n(ρ+log 2 (2n))−τ )/2 . Therefore given the constraints τ n·(ρ+log 2 (2n))+2λ and µ ρ + α + λ we have that ε 1 = negl(λ). Now, using Lemma 7 we obtain that the distribution of (params, r) if (ε 1 + ε 2 )-close to that of (params, D 2 µ Π ) for
We consider the initial level-0 encoding c and write c ≡ r Since c 1 = c · y mod x 0 , we have
Therefore r (1) ∞ 2 2ρ+log 2 ( )+α+2 . Now, by Fact 1, we have
This gives ε 2 2 −µ + 2 ρ+log 2 ( )+α+2−µ . With the constraint µ ρ + α + λ, Lemma 2 is proved.
5 Attacks against our Multilinear Scheme
Lattice Attack on the Encodings
We first describe a lattice attack against level-0 encodings. We consider an element x 0 = n i=1 p i and a set of τ integers x j ∈ Z x 0 such that:
where r ij ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) ∩ Z. We want to estimate the complexity of the classical orthogonal lattice attack for recovering (some of) the noise values r ij .
This attack works by considering the integer vector formed by a subset of the x j 's, say x = (x j ) 1 j t for some n < t τ , and relating the lattice of vectors orthogonal to x mod x 0 to the lattice of vectors orthogonal to each of the corresponding noise value vectors r i = (r ij ) 1 j t .
More precisely, let L ⊂ Z t the lattice of vectors u such that:
Clearly, L contains x 0 Z t so it is of full rank t. Moreover, we have
As a result, we heuristically expect the successive minima of L to be around vol(L) 1/t ≈ 2 n·η/t , and hence applying lattice reduction should yield a reduced basis (u 1 , . . . , u t ) with vectors of length u k ≈ 2 n·η/t+αt for some constant α > 0 depending on the lattice reduction algorithm (2 αt is the Hermite factor). Now, a vector u ∈ L satisfies u · x ≡ 0 (mod x 0 ), so for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, reducing modulo p i gives:
u · r i ≡ 0 (mod p i ).
In particular, if u is short enough to satisfy u · r i < p i , this implies u · r i = 0 in Z. As a result, if we have:
we expect the vectors (u 1 , . . . , u t−n ) from the previous lattice reduction step to be orthogonal to the r i 's, and hence computing the rank n orthogonal lattice to the lattice spanned by those vectors should reveal the r i 's. Since t must be greater than n for the attack to apply, condition (13) implies in particular that:
Since a Hermite factor of 2 αt is achieved in time 2 Ω(1/α) (usually by carrying out BKZ reduction with block size β = ω(1/α), in which each block is BKZ-reduced in time exponential in β, see e.g. [HPS11] ), we obtain that this orthogonal lattice attack has a complexity exponential in n.
In fact, with γ = η · n, we get a time complexity of 2 Ω(γ/η 2 ) , similar to [DGHV10, §5.2] (see also [CH12] ).
GCD Attack on the Zero-testing Parameter
We consider the ratio modulo x 0 of two coefficients from the zero-testing vector p zt , namely u := (p zt ) 1 /(p zt ) 2 mod x 0 . From (8) we obtain for all 1 i :
We can therefore recover p i by computing gcd(h i2 · u − h i1 , x 0 ) for all possible h i1 , h i2 . Since the h ij 's are upper bounded by 2 β in absolute value, the attack has complexity O(2 2β ). By using a technique similar to [CN12] , the attack complexity can be reduced toÕ(2 β ).
Hidden Subset Sum Attack on Zero Testing
One can consider an attack similar to Section 5.1 on the zero-testing parameters. The zero-testing vector ω = c · p zt mod x 0 corresponding to an encoding c of zero can be written as:
where the h i 's are the lines of the zero-testing matrix H. This gives an expression of ω as a linear combination of the unknown vectors h i , so we can think of an approach similar to the hidden subset sum attack of Nguyen and Stern [NS99] to recover the unknown h i 's or the R i 's. Such an approach, like the one from the previous section, would first involve computing the lattice L ⊂ Z n of vectors u orthogonal to ω modulo x 0 , and hoping that the vectors in a reduced basis of L are short enough that they must necessarily be orthogonal to each of the
However, L is a lattice of rank n and volume x 0 ≈ 2 n·η , so we expect its shortest vectors to be of length roughly 2 η . The attack can then only work if such a short vector u is necessarily orthogonal to each of the h i 's in Z n . Equivalently, this will happen if the vector v = (u · h 1 , . . . , u · h n ) ∈ Z n , which we know is orthogonal to (R 1 , . . . , R n ) modulo x 0 , is significantly shorter than the shortest vector in the lattice L of vectors orthogonal to (R 1 , . . . , R n ) modulo x 0 . But again L is of rank n and volume x 0 , so its shortest vectors is of length about 2 η , and hence v will typically not be shorter.
Therefore, the Nguyen-Stern hidden subset sum attack does not apply to our setting.
Attacks on the Inverse Zero Testing Matrix
A related observation is that if ω = c·p zt mod x 0 denotes again the zero-testing vector corresponding to an encoding c of zero, and T = (H −1 ) T is the inverse zero-testing matrix, then, by Equation (10):
where, as above, R i = r i · (x 0 /p i ). In particular, if the lines of T are written as t i , we get that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
Thus, since p i t i is relatively small, we might hope to recover it as a short vector in the lattice of vectors orthogonal to ω modulo x 0 . However, as we have seen previously, we expect a reduced basis of that lattice to have vectors of length roughly 2 η , whereas p i t i is of length about 2 η+β . Therefore, provided that, say, β is super-logarithmic, there are exponentially many linear combinations of the reduced basis vectors under the target length, and hence we cannot hope to recover p i t i in that fashion.
A more sophisticated attack based on the same observation uses the result of Hermann and May [HM08] on solving linear equations modulo an unknown factor of a public modulus. In our case, the components t ij of t i form a small solution (smaller than 2 β ) of the linear equation:
modulo the unknown factor x 0 /p i of x 0 . The technique of Hermann-May can thus recover t i and factor x 0 provided that β is small enough relative to x 0 . For sufficiently large n, by [HM08, Theorem 4], this should be possible as long as β/η < 1. However, as noted by the authors, the complexity of the attack is exponential in n (it involves reducing a lattice of dimension Ω(exp n)), and there does not seem to be a way to approximate the solution in polynomial time, so the attack does not apply to our setting even though we do choose β < η.
A Note on GGH's Zeroizing Attack
In [GGH13] the authors describe a "zeroizing" attack against their scheme that consists in multiplying a given level-i encoding c by a level-(κ − i) encoding of 0 to get a level-κ encoding of 0, and then multiplying by the zero-testing parameter p zt ; one obtains an encoding of the same coset as c but in the plaintext space. This attack does not enable to solve the GDDH problem because one does not get a small representative of that coset, but it enables to solve some decisional problems involving low-level (below κ) encodings, such as the decisional subgroup membership problem using composite-order maps, and the decisional linear problem.
Surprisingly this attack does not seem to apply against our scheme; namely we do not get a similar encoding in the plaintext space from the zero-testing parameter. Therefore the subgroup membership assumption and the decision linear assumption could still hold in our scheme.
Optimizations and Implementation
In this section we describe an implementation of our scheme in the one-round N -way Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol; we recall the protocol in Appendix D, as described in [BS03, GGH13] .
We note that without optimizations the size of the public parameters makes our scheme completely unpractical; this is also the case in [GGH13] . Namely, for sampling we need to store at least n · α encodings (resp. n · ρ encodings for re-randomization), each of size n · η bits; the public-key size is then at least n 2 · η · α bits. With n 10 4 , η 10 3 and α 80, the public-key size would be at least 1 TB. 3 Therefore we use three heuristic optimizations to reduce the memory requirement.
1. Non-uniform sampling: for the sampling algorithm we use a small number of encodings only; this implies that the sampling cannot be proved uniform anymore.
Non-uniform Sampling
For sampling level-zero encodings we use a smaller value for , the number of encodings x j in the public parameters. There is a simple meet-in-the-middle attack with complexity O(2 /2 ); therefore we take = 2λ. In this case the sampling cannot be proved uniform in R = Z g 1 × · · · × Z gn anymore. However this does not seem to make the GDDH problem easier. Note also that for such small given a level-0 encoding c, one can efficiently recover the coefficients of the subset sum with LLL, since this is a subset-sum problem with density /(η · n) 1; however this does not give an attack, as in GDDH such level-0 encoding c is not available. 4
Quadratic Re-randomization
To reduce the parameters size we use a simple optimization that consists in storing only a small subset of the public elements and combining them pairwise to generate the full public-key. Such optimization was originally described in [GH11] for reducing the size of the encryption of the secret-key bits in the implementation of Gentry's FHE scheme [Gen09] . It was also used in [CMNT11] to reduce the public-key size of the DGHV scheme; however, as opposed to [CMNT11] our randomization of encodings becomes heuristic only, whereas in [CMNT11] the semantic security was still guaranteed.
For re-randomization we only store ∆ = √ n encoding x Then by pairwise multiplication we can generate ∆ 2 n randomization elements at level 1, which are all encodings of 0. More precisely, we have for b = 0, 1 and 1 j ∆:
where r (b) ij are random ρ-bit integers, and f ij are random integers modulo g i . Given a level-1 encoding c 1 , we randomize it using a random subset-sum of pairwise products of the previous encodings:
where the α ij 's are random bits; note that we don't use the encodings Π j anymore. As a further optimization, we can use as in [CMNT11] a sparse vector α ij , with small Hamming weight θ. There is a meet-in-the-middle attack of complexity O(n θ/2 ). In our implementation we take θ = 16; the reRand operation then becomes very efficient.
Writing as previously c 1 ≡ (r i · g i + m i )/z (mod p i ), we obtain under this optimization:
When computing the product of κ such level-1 encodings and one level-0 encoding as in multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange, we obtain the following updated bound for the log 2 infinite norm of the vector r from Lemma 3:
ρ f κ · (2ρ + 2α + log 2 ( + θ)) + ρ + log 2 + 1 .
Zero-Testing Element
Instead of generating a zero-testing vector p zt with n components, we publish a zero-testing element p zt which is a single integer:
where the h i 's are random β-bit integers. Therefore, we obtain a single integer ω = p zt · c mod x 0 , with
As before, if r ∞ < 2 ρ f we still have |ω| < x 0 · 2 −ν−λ−2 . However the converse is no longer true: we can have |ω| < x 0 · 2 −ν for an encoding of a non-zero vector m. This implies that two encodings of different vectors can now extract to the same value. While it is actually easy to generate such collisions using LLL, this does not seem to give an attack against the GDDH problem.
Parameters and Timings
We have implemented a one-round N -way Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol with N = 7 users, in C++ using the Gnu MP library [Gt13] to perform operations on large integers. We refer to Appendix D for a description of the protocol. We provide our concrete parameters and the resulting timings in Table 1 Table 1 . Parameters and timings to instantiate a one-round 7-way Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol with = 160, β = 80, α = 80, N = 7 (i.e. κ = 6) and ν = 160 on a 16-core computer (Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-8837 at 2.67GHz) using GMP 5.1.1. Note that the Setup was parallelized on the 16 cores to speed-up the process while the other steps ran on a single core. We only derived a common ν-bit session key without using a randomness extractor.
The timings above show that our scheme is relatively practical, as the KeyGen phase of the multipartite Diffie-Hellman protocol requires only a few seconds per user; however the parameter size is still very large even with our optimizations.
B Proof of Lemma 3
We have assumed ρ f + λ + α + 2β η − 8 , which gives:
We consider the vector R = (R i ) 1 i n where:
Equation (10) can then be written:
If m = 0 then we have R i = r i · x 0 /p i for all i, which gives using p i 2 η−1 for all i:
Since by definition −p/2 < (z mod p) p/2, we have |z mod p| |z| for any z, p; therefore we obtain from (16) using r ∞ < 2 ρ f
Conversely assume that ω ∞ < x 0 · 2 −ν+2 . From (16) we have:
From (15) we have R ∞ < x 0 /2. Moreover from (14) we have ν − β α + 5, which gives
This shows that Equation (17) holds in Z and not only modulo x 0 ; therefore we must have
, and therefore |v i | p i · 2 β−ν+2 for all i. We have g i · (v i − r i ) ≡ m i (mod p i ); we show that the equality actually holds over Z. Namely for all i we have |m i | < g i < p i /2 and:
which implies that the equality holds over Z. Therefore m i ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for all i, which implies m = 0. This proves Lemma 3.
C Comparison with GGH Multilinear Maps
In this section we rewrite our scheme using exactly the same notations as in [GGH13] whenever possible, to better highlight the similarities. The construction in [GGH13] works in the polynomial ring R = Z[X]/(X n + 1), where n is large enough to ensure security. One generates a secret short ring element g ∈ R, generating a principal ideal I = g ⊂ R. One also generates an integer parameter q and another random secret z ∈ R/qR. One encodes elements of the quotient ring R/I, namely elements of the form e + I for some e, as follows: a level-i encoding of the coset e + I is an element of the form u k = [c/z i ] q , where c ∈ e + I is short. Such encodings can be both added and multiplied, as long as the norm of the numerators remain shorter than q; in particular the product of κ encodings at level 1 gives an encoding at level κ. For such level-κ encodings one can then define a zero-testing parameter p zt = [hz κ /g] q , for some small h ∈ R. Then given a level-κ encoding u = [c/z κ ] one can compute [p zt · u] q = [hc/g] q ; when c is an encoding of zero we have c/g ∈ R, which implies that hc/g is small in R, and therefore [hc/g] q is small; this provides a way to test whether a level-κ encoding c is an encoding of 0.
In our construction one could write R = Z n , and define a secret short ring element g ∈ R, generating a principal ideal I = g ⊂ R, which gives I = (g i Z) 1 i n . We also generate a ring element p ∈ R and let the principal ideal J = p ⊂ R, which gives J = (p i Z) 1 i n . We let q := x 0 = n i=1 p i and for convenience we denote by [u] q the CRT isomorphism from R/J to Z q . As in [GGH13] , in our scheme a level-i encoding of the coset e I = e + I is an element of the form u = [c/z i ] q where c ∈ e I is short. Such encodings can be both added and multiplied, by working over the integers via the CRT isomorphism [·] q .
However, we cannot apply the zero-testing procedure from [GGH13] in a straightforward way. Namely one could define the zero-testing parameter p zt = [hz κ /g] q as in [GGH13] where h ∈ Z n is a relatively small ring element. As in [GGH13] given a level-κ encoding u = [c/z κ ] q one would compute the element:
As in [GGH13] if u is an encoding of 0 then c is a multiple of g over Z n hence c/g ∈ Z n is short and therefore the vector hc/g ∈ Z n is short. However this does not imply that the corresponding integer ω obtained by CRT in (19) is small, and we do not have a simple way of identifying integers whose reductions modulo the unknown p i 's are small. Instead, we can define a slightly different notation: we consider the following additive homomorphism R/J −→ Z q u → {u} q = 
As in [GGH13] if u is an encoding of 0 then c is a multiple of g over Z n hence c/g ∈ Z n is short and therefore the vector hc/g ∈ Z n is short; this time, this implies that ω = {hc/g} q is a short integer.
D One-Round N -Way Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol
In 2003, Boneh and Silverberg showed how to perform a multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange using multilinear maps [BS03] . As in [GGH13] , our scheme can be used to instantiate a one-round N -party Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in the common reference string model, under the GDDH assumption with N = κ + 1 users. Consider N parties wishing to set up a shared secret key s using a one-round protocol (i.e. each party broadcasts one value to all other parties). We recall the construction from [GGH13] :
Setup(1 λ , 1 N ). Output (params, p zt ) ← InstGen(1 λ , 1 κ ) as the public parameter, with κ = N − 1.
Publish(params, i).
Each party i samples a random c i ← samp(params) as a secret key, and publishes as the public key the corresponding level-1 encoding c i ← reRand(params, 1, enc(params, 1, c i )).
KeyGen params, p zt , i, c i , {c j } j =i . Each party i computesc i = c i · j =i c j , and uses the extraction routine to compute the key s ← ext(params, p zt ,c i ).
Theorem 3 ([GGH13]
). The protocol described above is a one-round N -way Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol if the GDDH assumption holds for the underlying encoding scheme.
E Uniform Sampling of a Parallelepiped
In order to sample a uniformly random element in the half-open parallelepiped defined by the column vectors j of matrix Π ∈ Z n×n , one can proceed as follows. First, compute the Smith Normal Form for Π. This is easily done in polynomial time, and can be done with near optimal complexity using Storjohann's algorithm [Sto96] . This yields a basis (b 1 , . . . , b n ) of Z n and positive integers d 1 , . . . , d n such that (d 1 b 1 , . . . , d n b n ) is a basis of the lattice L generated by the columns of Π.
Then, if we pick integers x 1 , . . . , x n at random such that x i is uniformly distributed in {0, . . . , d i − 1}, then clearly, the vector x = x 1 b 1 + · · · + x n b n is uniformly distributed modulo L.
To get a uniformly distributed vector in the half-open parallelepiped defined by the j 's, it then suffices to apply Babai's round-off algorithm [Bab86] , i.e. write x as a rational linear combination ξ 1 1 + · · · + ξ n n of the j 's and return the vector y given by:
That vector is congruent to x modulo L, so it is also in Z n and uniformly distributed modulo L, and it belongs to the parallelepiped by construction, so it is indeed a uniformly distributed element of the parallelepiped.
and H −1 satisfies the same bound. The set of matrices H obtained in this manner is not very simple to describe but it is exponentially large.
